

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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CARLOS NORWOOD,

Plaintiff,

v.

WASHOE COUNTY JAIL, *et al.*,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:23-cv-00350-MMD-CSD

ORDER

Plaintiff Carlos Norwood brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while detained at Washoe County Detention Center. (ECF No. 1-1.) On August 2, 2023, this Court ordered Norwood to file a fully complete application to proceed *in forma pauperis* or pay the full \$402 filing fee on or before October 2, 2023. (ECF No. 5.) The Court warned Norwood that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file a fully complete application to proceed *in forma pauperis* with all three documents or pay the full \$402 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline. (*Id.* at 2.) That deadline expired and Norwood did not file a fully complete application to proceed *in forma pauperis*, pay the full \$402 filing fee, or otherwise respond.

District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. *Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles*, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See *Carey v. King*, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring *pro se* plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); *Malone v. U.S. Postal Service*, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining

1 whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the  
2 public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court's need to manage its  
3 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition  
4 of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See *In re*  
5 *Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting  
6 *Malone*, 833 F.2d at 130).

7 The first two factors, the public's interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation  
8 and the Court's interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Norwood's  
9 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal  
10 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing  
11 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See *Anderson v. Air West*, 542  
12 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of  
13 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal.

14 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can  
15 be used to correct the party's failure that brought about the Court's need to consider  
16 dismissal. See *Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier*, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining  
17 that considering less drastic alternatives *before* the party has disobeyed a court order  
18 does not satisfy this factor); accord *Pagtalunan v. Galaza*, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th  
19 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that  
20 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court's  
21 order as satisfying this element[,]” *i.e.*, like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled  
22 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by *Yourish*).  
23 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a  
24 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” *Henderson v. Duncan*, 779  
25 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and  
26 unless Norwood either files a fully complete application to proceed *in forma pauperis* or  
27 pays the \$402 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter a second order  
28 setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only

1 delays the inevitable and squanders the Court's finite resources. The circumstances here  
2 do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Norwood needs  
3 additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court's order. Setting another  
4 deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor  
5 favors dismissal.

6 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they  
7 weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without  
8 prejudice based on Norwood's failure to file a fully complete application to proceed *in*  
9 *forma pauperis* or pay the full \$402 filing fee in compliance with this Court's August 2,  
10 2023, order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this  
11 case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Norwood wishes to  
12 pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case.

13 It is further ordered that Norwood's incomplete application to proceed *in forma*  
14 *pauperis* (ECF No. 1) is denied.

15 DATED THIS 31<sup>st</sup> Day of October 2023.

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18 MIRANDA M. DU  
19 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE  
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